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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.2
Right of Married Woman to Rent of separate Real Estate.--The rent
ot real estate bought by a married woman, who had with her husband
given a mortgage for the purchase-money, cannot be attached by one of
his creditors for a debt contracted by him after the purchase: Goff vs.
Nuttall and Kirkpatrick.
Liability of Garnishee for Interest.-As in foreign, so in execution at-
tachment, interest on a debt due by the garnishee to his creditor as whose
property it was attached, is suspended during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings, if there be no fraud, collusion, or wilful delay on the part of the
defendant or garnishee: Jackson's Executors vs. Lloyd.
Competency of Witness- When to be objected to.-An objection to a
witness called by one party in the trial of a cause, if known to the opposite
party, must be made before he is examined: if he is permitted to testify
without objection, his competency cannot afterwards be objected to when
recalled for examination, at any subsequent stage of the trial: Patterson
& Co. vs. Wallace.
Assignment, when valid without recording or filing Inventoy.-An as-
signment by a railroad company of unpaid instalments due on subscriptions
to capital stock, to an indorser, to secure him against loss by reason of his
indorsement for the company, is not an assignment in trust for creditors,
and therefore is not invalid, because not recorded nor an inventory filed
within thirty days thereafter : .McBroom & Wood's Appeal.
Liens, prior to Fraudulent Conveyance, not divested by Sherofl"s Saie
under subsequent .in- What Estate passes by such Sale-Proceeds of
Sale distributed among all subsequent Creditors.-Where the owner of
land encumbered with liens makes a conveyance fraudulent against cred-
itors, and the land is sold by the sheriff under a judgment subsequently
obtained, the liens existing before the conveyance remain, and are there-
:'ore not payable out of the proceeds of the sale: .Hoffman's Appeal.
The estate of thd debtor is what is sold under the execution; and those
I From R. E Wright, Esq., to appear in Vol. VIII. of his Reports.
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liens only which attached after thefraudulent grant, are payable, in their
order, out of the proceeds : Id.
Rijht of Employee to recover on Contract for Services for a determinate
period-Evidence for Defendant in mitigation of.Damages.-An employee
for a determinate period, if improperly dismissed before the term of servic6
has expired, is primd facie entitled to recover the stipulated compensation
for the whole time: King & Graham vs. Steiren.
If the plaintiff was engaged in other profitable employment during the
term, or such employment was offered to him and refused, the defendan4
upon whom is the burden of proof, may show it, in mitigation of damages;
ld.
Surety not discharged by Notice to sue Principal -in Note not yet due.-
A notice by a surety on an undue note, that he would not remain respon
sible, if the holder did not sue the principal debtor as soon as the nob
came due or get other security, will not discharge the surety : Hellen vA
Crawford.
Liability of Special Partner under the Limited Partnership Law.-U&.
der the Limited Partnership Law, a special partner cannot be personalli
involved except by his own acts of violation or omission of duty, or by as-
senting to those of his copartners when he knows or is presumed to know
them : Singer vs. Kelly.
Hence an alteration by the general partners, in the nature of the business
provided for in the certificate of copartnership, without the knowledge of
the special partner, does not make-him a general partner so as to render him
personally liable to the creditors of the firm : Id.
It is not the duty of the special partner to care for or collect the assets
of.the firm after failure: Id.
The special partner could not be affected by any assignments of the as-
sets of the firm, if he had not assented thereto; and where theie was no
offer to prove that assent, but only that the general partners had made
them, it was properly rejected: Id.
Proper mode of answering Points propounded to, the Court-Liability
of General Partners for Trespass of Agent and Empoyees-Liability of
Special Partner under Limited Partnership Law for Trespass of Agent of
Firm-Measure of Plaintif's Damage in Trespass.-Where propositions
embodied in points propounded to the court are true as general principles,
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they should not be negatived without qualification, but if deemed inappli-
cable to the circumstances of the case, the court should refuse on that
ground to charge as requested: McEnight vs. Rat.lifand Johnson.
Partners are liable for a trespass by themselves or their agents, em
ployees, or servants, in the legitimate conduct of the partnership business:
or if the trespass be done by their agents or workmen, acting within the
scope of their authority or while in the employment of the firm: Rd.
In an action for causing the flooding of plaintiff's coal-mine, brought
against three defendants individually, who were carrying on business under
a limited partnership, two of them being general partners (one of whom
died before trial), and the other the special partner, it was sought to charge
the latter by proof that he had done some act, which under the law ren-
dered him liable as a general partner. Hed, that as he was not a man-
aging partner, employing the workmen and directing their operations, proof
of an act, having no relation to the trespass sued for, which might make
him liable for firm debts, did not establish that trespass against him, or
raise the presumption of his assent and consequent liability: and hence it
was error to instruct the jury that if the special partner had made himself
a general partner, and the act complained of was done by the agents of
the firm, and assented to by one of the partners, the special partner was
equally liable with the other, and the verdict must be against both: Id.
Where there was no proof to charge the special as a general partner,
the jury should have been instructed that there was no evidence which in
point of law made him liable in the action: Id.
Though the defendants, who were in the mining business, permitted the
plaintiffs, in the same business, to operate through their gangway, that per-
mission would not justify the defendants in wilfully filling up the plaintiffs'
shaft with water; the question is not one of negligence, wherein counter
negligence would have been a defence, but a case in which the injury was
alleged to have been- wilful, and within the scope of the duties of defend-
ants' workmen and employees: .d.
Where a point was presented by defendants, to the effect, that if the
plaintiffs had notified and informed defendants that the water would escape
before it could damage them, then any damages done resulted from their own
misrepresentations, for which they could not recover; it should have been
affirmed, referring.the special circumstances of the case to the jury: .d.
The measure of damages was the actual injury sustained in delay,
Ios of time, damage to machinery, &c., and if the mine Was irreclaimable
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then the value of the estate and property; but merely speculative proas
supposed to have been lost cannot be included; it was therefore error to
instruct the jury, that "if the mine was rendered entirely useless, then
the profits that might have been made out of the coal, would be a fair
basis for estimating damages :" Id.
Rights of Special Partner as (reditor-Limited Partnershi.-Under
the Limited Partnership Act, the special partner cannot claim as a creditor
of an insolvent firm of which he was a member: Dunning's Ay'eal.
Promise topay the Debt of another, when not required to be in Writ'ng,
under the Statute of Frauds.-The Statute of Frauds does not require the
promise of a defendant to be in writing where it is in effect to pay his own
debt, though that of a third person be incidentally guaranteed : it applies
to the mere promise to become responsible, but not to actual obligations.
Hence, where contractors to build a railroad, on settlement vith a sub-
contractor for work done for them, gave in part payment one of the notes of
the company, verbally agreeing to pay it if the company did not, the promise
was not within the Statute of Frauds: and on failure of the company to
pay their hote, an action would lie against the promissors : Malone et al. vs.
.eener.
SUPREME COURT OF ILLNSY1 "
Responsibility of Railroad Company for safety of Passengers.-The
responsibility of a railroad company for the safety of their passeng4rs does
not depend on the kind of cars on which they are carried, whether pas-
senger, construction, or freight cars, or on the fact of payment of fare by
the passenger: The Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. vs. luhling..
If the passenger is lawfully on the cars, the company is bound to carry
him safely, whether he has paid his fare or not; but if he refuses to pay,
on demand, the company may eject him from the train: Id.
(Currency, meaning and value of.-By the term "currency," bank-bills
or other paper money, issued by authority, which pass as and for coin, are
understood : Springfield Marine and Fire. Insurance Co. vs. lincher et al.
Current bills, or currency, are of the value of cash, and exclude the
idea of depreciated paper money: id.
Sherr's excessive and d-ficient Levy-Dam'ages.:-In determining the
From Hon. E. Peck, late Reporter, to appear in 30 Illinois Reports.
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amount 6f property necessary to be levied upon to satisfy an execution,
the officer should take into account the probable sacrifice to which it would
be subject at- a public sale: French et al. vs. Snyder.
In an action against a sheriff for failing to collect an execution, it is no
defence, that the sheriff had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe:
that he had seized sufficient property: Id.
He should show further, that he used such diligence as governs prudent
men in the management of their own business. He should take property
enough to allow for the probable depreciation of a public sale. And at
the same time he should not make so excessive a levy as to bear on its
face the appearance of oppression and unnecessary rigor: Id
In an action against a sheriff for failing to collect an execution, thlb
damages are not necessarily the amount of the execution, but only such
damages as the plaintiff shall actually suffer by the sheriff's neglect: Id.
Statute of Limitations-New Promise.-A verbal promise to pay a
note, previously given, has the same effect, as regards the Statute of
Limitations, as a redelivery of the note; and the note is good for the
same period that it would be if it were dated on the day of the new
promise: Sennott, Administratrix, vs. Homer et aL
Accommodation lndorsers-Riht to Indemnity.-Where county bonds
have been deposited by a railroad company with its president, under an
agreement with an accommodation indorser, that the bonds should be held
for the purpose of paying notes, which had been indorsed for the benefit
of the company; the president becomes a trustee, independent of his
official character, and is personally responsible for the execution of the
trust: In such a case it will Ie no defence for him to allege that be was
directed by the corporation to make another disposition of the bonds:
WM7linson vs. Stewart et al.
An indorser, who takes up and cancels the indorsed paper by giving a
new obligation, has a right to regard this as a payment, and to call upon
his principal for indemnity: Id.
Assignment of Promissory Note- Consideration.-When a promissory
note is assigned before maturity, but without any consideration therefor,
the assignee takes it as a volunteer subject to all its infirmities in the
hands of his assigiior, the same as if he had had actual notice of them, or
as if the note had been assigned after maturity: Rarpham vs. ilaynes.
A plea that the payee of a note, at the time suit was instituted, wrote
his name on the back and then commenced the suit in the name of the
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plaintiff, and without his knowledge or consent, is bad. It should state
further, that the plaintiff had not subsequently sanctioned or approved the
use of his name: Id.
Mandamus--- When it should issue-Effect of Speaker's Certificte-
Mandamus to Secretary of State-Mandamus to Governor of a Stetc.-
Evidence- What Evidence of Legislative Proceedings is competent-
AdUournment of Legislature-Resumption of Session-Days-Meaning
of Term.-The writ of mandamus ought not to issue unless the right of
the relator is clear to have the things sought by it done, and unless the
party sought to be coerced ought to do it: People, ex rel. IBarless, vs. The
Secretary of State; People, ex rel. Keyes, vs. The Auditor of Public Ac-
counti of the State of Illinois: Per BREESE.'
The certificate of the Speaker *of a House of Representatives, certifying
the attendance of the party therein named as a member of the house, is
not conclusive upon the auditor of state. The latter officer may act upon
his own knowledge of the fact, and if he decides wrong, the party injured
may correct the erroneous decision by mandamus, if no other remedy
exists : Id.
This writ confers no new right. It can only compel the performance
of an existing. duty. The secretary of.state cannot virtute offici decide
what acts make a law. He can only certify to be laws those which have
been properly authenticated and deposited with him as such, and he can-
not be called on to determine whether a bill is or is not a law. Thetefore
a mandamus will not issue to compel the secretary of state to make a copy
of a bill under the seal of the state and certify that the same is a law by
reason of the failure of the governor to return it with his objections to the
legislature within the required number of days: Id.
.It seems that the governor of a state cannot be coerced by mandamus
to perform an official duty. (But see The State vs. MA"offitt, 5 Ohio Rep.
d62) : ld.
Where the constitution requires the legislature to keep a journal of its
proceedings, parol evidence of such proceedings cannot, it seems, be ad-
mitted: Id.
If the members of a legislature disperse and abandon the capital, it is
a practical "adjournment" of the body, though no entry thereof is made
,apon the journals: Id.
If the executive makes an order for the adjournment of a legislature
I These cases were decided very lately, and the volume of reports in which "hey
will appear cannot yet be ascertained.
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without the happening of the contingency which would authorize such
order, yet if it is acquiesced in and the members accordingly disperse, the
session is terminated notwithstanding the order may be illegal: .ld.
After a session is terminated in any mode it cannot be resumed at a
future day at a time not fixed by law, without a previous vote of the two
houses or. by due proclamation by the governor, unless, perhaps, in case
where the body is dispersed by sudden insurrection or external force: "Id
The constitution of fllinois allows the governor the full period of ten
days of twenty-four hours each, excluding Sundays, and not simply ten
legislative days, in which to return bills which he does not approve: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACEUSETTS. i
Insurance- Warranty against Perils of the Sea, Capture, Seizure, &c.-
Capture by 0ruiser of so-called Confederate States.-A warranty by the
assured in a policy of insurance that the vessel shall be free from capture,
seizure, or detention, includes a capture by a cruiser of the so-called Con-
federate States: Dole vs. New England Mutual Marine ins. Co.
In case of a warranty by the insured in a policy of insurance that the
vessel shall be free from capture, seizure, or detention, the liability of the
insurers is terminated by a capture by a cruiser of the so-called Confederate
States, so that they are not liable for the burning of the vessel immediately
thereafter,. although the policy contains a provision that in case of capture
or detention the insured shall not have the right to abandon therefor until
proof is exhibited of condemnation, or of the continuance of the detention
by capture or other arrest for at least ninety days : Id.
Under a policy of insurance of a vessel against perils of the seas, fire,
enemies, pirates, assailing thieves, restraints, and detainments, of all kings,
princes, or people, &c., with an agreement contained in the policy that in
case of capture or detention the insured shall not have the right to abandon
therefor until proof is exhibited of condemnation, or of the continuance
of the detention by capture or other arrest for at least ninety days, and
that the insurers shall not be answerable for any charge, damage, or loss
which may arise in consequence of seizure or detention for or on account
of illicit or prohibited trade, or trade in articles contraband of war, a printed
stipulation in the margin of the policy, by which the insured warrant
the vessel free from capture, seizure, or detention, any stipulation in the
policy to the contrary notwithstanding, exonerates the insurers from lia
I From Charles Allen, Esq.; to appear in Vol. VL of his Reports.
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bility, in case of a capture by % cruiser of the so-called Confederate
States: Id.
Common Carrier--General Notice to limit Liabilty.-A" common
carrier cannot, by a general notice, exonerate himself entirely from his
legal duty and liability for property which is delivered to him for trans-
portation, or fix the amount beyond which he will not be held responsible
in case of injury or loss; although such property is delivered to him by
another carrier, to whom the notice has been made known, and who re-
ceived the same from the owner under an agreement to carry it over his
own line, and then, as agent of the consignor, to send it forward by a
carrier: Judson vs. Western Railroad Co.
Shipping- Charter-Party- Construction of Contract.-Under a char.
ter-party of a vessel for an entire voyage to ports in the Mediterranean
and back to the United States, for a gross sum, "and all foreign port
charges, pilotages, and lighterages, and to furnish sums abroad for the
ordinary disbursements of the vessel, not to exceed five hundred dollars,
said advance to be furnished at cost and free of commission, charter pay-
able on discharge of cargo at port in the United States," if the vessel is
lost after the advance of the five hundred dollars and before reaching the
United States,-the owner is liable to a claim for reimbursement in favor
of the shipper, and may recover on a policy by which the freight is insured,
without deduction on account of the advance: Benner vs. Equitable In-
surance Co.
Eighway-Maintenance of Fence. Title by Limitation.-Maintaining a
'fence within the limits of a highway for forty years, under a claim of right,
gives to the owner an absolute right, under the statutes of this common-
wealth, to continue it there, as against the public: Cutter vs. Cambridge.
Water dripping from Roof-njury to Building in conseuence.-If the
roof of a building is so constructed that the water which falls or accu-
mulates thereon is projected therefrom so as to be thrown over the line of
the owner's land, and in and upon the premises of the adjoining proprietor,
in such quantities and manner as to weaken, impair, or in any way injure
a wall of the latter, by means whereof the same is in part caused to fall
upon the building, a tenant of the building cannot recover damages for
tae injury thereby occasioned to his property oi business therein: Martin
vs Simpson.
Mortgage-Defeasance not of same Date as Deed.-In order to con-
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stitute a mortgage, it is not necessary that a bond of defeasance from the
grantee to the grantor in a deed should bear the same date as the deed.
Biut if, after the making of such a bond, a deed has been given in accord-
ance with its terms, and afterwards the premises are reconveyed to the
obligor, and it is agreed that the same bond shall continue in force for the
same purpose, this will amount to a redelivery of the bond, and make the
transaction a mortgage: McIntire vs. Shaw.
Unincorporated Society-l'itle to Land conveyed to-Rights of fembers
of.-A deed of land to an organized and acting, though unincorporated,
religious society, vests a valid title in the grantees as a body, and does not
create a tenancy in common among the individuals who compose the
society: ifamblett & Wife vs. Bennett.
A vote by such society, which has received a grant of land and built a
church thereon, that a committee "have charge of the church and base-
ment, and see that the whole be kept in repair," authorizes the committee,
or one of them who acts for the whole, to take possession thereof, lock up
the same, and remove any person therefrom who has not a superior right:
1a.
Neither an unincorporated association formed by members of a religious
society for charitable and religious purposes, and by its constitution made
auxiliary to the society, nor its members, acquire any permanent rights in
or become tenants at will of the basement of the church, by reason of
having contributed to the expense of fitting it up, under a general agree-
ment, not expressed in any vote or other formal manner, that they might
use it for their meetings, and for fairs and parties: Id.
Hv.band and Wife-Curtesy.-The birth of living children, after the
conveyance by a married woman of land held by her to her sole and oepa-
i:te use, under St. 1845, c. 208, will entitle her husband, after her death,
ti an estate by the curtesy therein: Comer vs. Chamberlain and Others.
Harried Woman-Separate Business-Promissory Note.-A married
woman who carries on the business of farming upon land for which she
holds a bond for a deed, to her sole and separate use, is liable upon a pro-
missory note given by her for money borrowed to enable her to pay for
the land, and actuilly applied by her to that purpose, and thus to entitle
herself to a deed under the bond: C apman vs. Foster.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.'
Liability for Damages caused by Carelessness and Negligence in the use
of Fire.-The defendants being engaged in removing a sunken boat from
the channel of a canal, by means of a steam dredging-machine, using wood
for fuel, without any spark-catcher or screen upon their smoke-stack, the
wind blew the sparks and cinders to and over the farm-buildings of, the
plaintiff; and although notified of the danger to the buildings, they cob.
tinued to use their dredge, without putting on a spark-catcher, or using
any extra precaution to prevent injury from fire. field, that the def.end-
ants were guilty of carelessness and negligence, and were liable for the
damages occasioned by fire communicated to the buildings by means of
their sparks: Teall vs. Barton et al.
Fraudulent Intent, how proved-Deed-Presumption as to Consideraton,
how rebutted..-In actions involving questions of fraud, the intent is always
a material inquiry; and for the purpose of establishing that, other acts of
a similar character, done about the same time, may always be shown:
Amsden vs. Manchester.
Hence, in an action to set aside a conveyance made by a debtor in fraud
of his creditors, evidence showing what other property he had, at or before
the time, and the value thereof, and that he had conveyed the same to
different grantees without consideration, and with intent to defraud his
creditors, is admissible on two grounds: 1st. To show the situation of the
debtor in respect to his property at the time in question, and what has
been done with the property he previously had; and 2d. For the purpose
of establishing the fraudulent intent charged in the complaint: Id.
A deed expressing a money consideration, and acknowledging the pay.
ment thereof, is primd facie evidence that such was the true consideration,
ana that it has been paid. But a judgment-creditor has the right to rebut
the presumption, and to show that the sum specified in the deed was never
paid by the grantee: Id.
For this purpose it is proper to show that the grantee was a married
woman, and had no separate property or estate, before the execution- of
the deed; and that her husband was notoriously poor, and destitute of the
means of paying the consideration specified in the conveyance: Id.
Assignment in Trust for the benefit of Creditors.-An assignment in
1.From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, to appear in Vol. XL. of his Reports.
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trust for the benefit of creditors, of "1 all the goods, chattels," &c., "and
property of every name and nature whatsoever" of the assignor, stated to
be more particularly enumerated and described in a schedule annexed to
the assignment, operates to transfer to the assignee property not mentioned
in the schedule: Turner vs. Jaycox et al.
-A provision in an assignment executed by partners for the payment of
the private and individual debts of the assignors, out of the residue of
the net proceeds of the assigned property remaining after the payment of
all the debts of'the partnership, furnishes no evidence of an intention to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors: Id.
It seems the legal intendments are all in favor of the validity of assign.
ments in trust for the benefit of creditors, the same as in respect to other
instruments: If.
Bu7dng-Contracets-Recoupment.-Where, in an action to recover
money due for work done under a building-contract, the defence is that
the building was not completed within the time stipulated, if it appears
that the defendant had the building erected for his own use, and that he'
was kept out of its use by the plaintiff's failure to perform on his part, the
law will presume that he was damnified, and will give him, by way of
compensation, what such use was worth for the time he was deprived of
it: Wagner vs. C'orkhig.
So if he shdws that he was deprived of the privilege of renting the
building by the plaintiff's default: Id.
But if it be proved that the defendant did not contemplate using the
building himself, or in his own business, but that he caused it to be built
for the purpose of renting it to others; and that he did not in fact lose
any opportunity of renting it, by reason of the plaintiff's delay, he cannot
recoupe against the plaintiff's claim, the rents and profits of the building
from the time when it should have been, to the time when it was, com-
pleted: Id.
Bankers, Liability for Deposits-Assignment of Claim- Corporation,
Power of Officers.-Where money is deposited with a banker to the credit
of another, the former becomes indebted to the latter for the amount,
payable on demand. But if the banker, by his words or conduct, denies
the right of the depositor, as by placing the deposit to the credit of a third
person, he thereby becomes presently liable to an action for the amount
without a formal demand: Carroll et al. vs. Cone.
So held where the banker voluntarily, and without authority from th(
